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Ethics and education: taking globalization seriously1 
Penny Enslin University of Glasgow  
  
1 Introduction 
Although the effects of globalisation on education have received much attention in educational 
research, some of its far-reaching implications are yet to be established – not least with reference to 
ethical issues. Taking the field of ethics as a broad one that encompasses questions of justice in access 
to education and of democracy in making decisions about its provision, this paper argues the case for 
central ethical concepts in education to be interpreted in a global frame, beyond the conceptual 
confines of the nation state, and it considers what this might mean. My underlying claim is that 
globalisation’s effects and significance are profound, but that while new global practices, norms and 
structures are increasingly evident, developing our key ethical concepts and assumptions accordingly 
is limited by the narrow and outdated pre-global moral universe of the nation state. The intertwined 
demands of justice and democracy in education require conceptual adjustment to meet a different 
world, but so far they remain hampered by the influential assumptions of the Westphalian system of 
nation states. 
Rapid globalisation is under way across many spheres, including education. Adjusting to the 
consequences of the globalising processes in play, which sometimes seem beyond control, demands 
scrutiny of the very concepts we use to discuss ethical issues, in this paper those of justice and 
democracy. Here I take these complementary concepts to be fundamentally about who gets what 
education (justice) and how the allocation of educational resources is decided (democracy). Such 
scrutiny reveals the need for conceptual correction, a process that has to start with the concepts 
associated with the framework of the Westphalian system of supposedly sovereign, territorially 
defined nation states which globalisation has loosened from empirical reality, though these 
associations were never a completely accurate way of describing the system of states (here I draw on 
Caporaso 2000: 4). While the concepts we use are supposed to group elements of our experience in 
such a way as to make them understandable, connecting abstraction and empirical observation, 
prevalent and influential assumptions about the nation state fail to do so and are no longer fruitful.  
Relying on the influential conception of philosophical method as analysis of how we typically use 
concepts would be inherently conservative and unequal to the task of taking globalisation seriously in 
the ethics of educational distribution. We need to look to new uses that match new circumstances. 
                                                          
1 This paper draws in parts on work co-authored with Mary Tjiattas (see Enslin and Tjiattas, 2012 and 2015). 
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In pursuit of such conceptual adjustment, the paper proceeds as follows. First, the features and 
significance of globalisation will be considered, with particular reference to globalisation in 
education, as well as political globalisation as indicative of the now outdated viability of the powerful 
model of the Westphalian state. Secondly, a revised conception of justice based on recognition of 
global association will be sketched and illustrated by the case of the global campaign for Education 
for All. Thirdly, possibilities for globally democratic decision-making after the monopoly of the 
nation state will be outlined, noting scepticism about the idea of global democracy, advancing the 
discussion towards some concluding observations about the implications of the argument for the 
education of global citizens.  
2 Globalisation: meaning and significance 
Accounts of globalisation vary between differing emphases. Scheuerman’s entry in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (online source) emphasises a triad: ‘deterritorialization, social 
interconnectedness, and acceleration’, which have recently become more intense due to innovations in 
information technologies and transportation. Communication has become instantaneous, as 
technology minimises distance and fosters simultaneity. So possibilities for social connection and 
deterritorialisation are heightened. To Scheuerman’s type of primary emphasis on spatial and 
temporal shifts, we can contrast Meyer’s (2007) preferred emphasis on globalisation as cultural and 
institutional. With an over-emphasis on the economic as his critical target, Meyer argues that:  
Discussions of globalization tend to emphasize economic dimensions of expanded world 
transactions more than is justified. They see more change in economic interdependence than 
really exists. More important, they understate the intensely sociocultural character of change 
in the modern global system. (Meyer 2007:262) 
Rather than heightened levels of exchange and consequent economic integration, or the political and 
military interdependencies that he also acknowledges, Meyer focuses on interdependence in cultural 
consciousness, in what he chooses to call a world or global society, while adding that this comes 
nothing close to any world state. People and associations now frame themselves in global terms. 
Societies and states adopt policies and institutional arrangements that are globally informed (p. 263). 
So Meyer emphasises globalisation as cultural and institutional, citing as evidence that societies and 
states  define themselves and their people in standardised ways as committed to economic, political, 
social and cultural progress, pursuing to varying degrees political, social and economic rights, 
including to education. He cites as examples of modern world culture the authority of science, 
collaborative peacekeeping efforts, a culture of regulation, e.g. in monitoring elections, corruption 
watchdogs, as well as global movements for human rights and the environment. Educational systems 
increasingly adopt similar models in policy, organisation, curriculum and enrolment (p. 267).  So, as 
examples of these globalising trends, he notes that women’s enrolment has expanded, curricula 
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emphasise maths and science, and English is a lingua franca. As mass primary school enrolments 
aspire towards universal access, citizens are educated to develop a country’s human capital.  
That many governments explicitly pursue educational policies intended to make their domestic 
economies more competitive is, however, evidence that globalisation nonetheless occurs across and 
between nation states pursuing their own interests and still politically defined as separate political and 
moral spheres. This definition now demands critical scrutiny. Scheuerman’s analysis draws to our 
attention the fundamental challenge that globalisation’s deterritorialisation and intensified interactions 
present to traditional assumptions about nation states as bounded communities. Clear distinctions 
between domestic and foreign are no longer consistent with actual social relations and so we ‘need to 
rethink key questions of normative political theory’ (Scheuerman: online source).  
The historical framework of the Westphalian system of states dates to the signing of two treaties in 
1648 (of Osnabruck and Munster) that ended the Thirty Years War in Europe. Signatories agreed to 
respect the territorial integrity of bounded states, within which rulers would exercise sovereign 
authority without outside interference. This system developed and shifted internally over centuries, 
with additional layers of meaning added later, as national identities were fostered, roughly more or 
less to match separate states, and the franchise was extended to include a widening pool of citizens. 
As relatively recent modern conceptions of citizenship took hold and sovereign nation states became 
the locus for political rights and duties, their borders came to be understood as boundaries of moral 
obligation. In many instances these borders replaced those of the village and the tribe, though even 
that process is far from universally complete. But with the growing global association across these 
boundaries, as the result of the forms of integration we have noted as comprising globalisation, has 
come the de facto decline of the authority of the state over a clearly delineated territorial community.  
Of course, the Westphalian state is at least partly a myth. Very much European in origin, its vaunted 
principles were hardly respected by European colonial powers in the age of imperial expansion. Even 
in the postcolonial era, richer mainly western powers have effectively continued to construct and 
benefit from the global order that prevails between supposedly autonomous, independent states. And 
while Westphalian principles of national sovereignty are routinely invoked, they are also observed in 
the breach, as demonstrated in the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. In the failed states and the 
poorest members of the international system of states, there is limited government authority at best. 
Elements of political and economic globalisation, including voluntary agreements on international co-
operation and the fact that states have also involuntarily ceded some of their authority to largely 
unaccountable international corporations, add up to a dilution of the state’s monopoly on power. The 
movement of money, people and disease across borders is difficult to control. But the hold of the 
consequential though largely uncontested Westphalian concept of the state remains strong and its 
presence makes thinking about justice and democracy beyond this immediate bounded context 
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initially difficult because this seems implausible. Yet it is important to stress that I am not, in raising 
the question of the status and future of the nation state, arguing its irrelevance or calling for its 
dismantling. It continues to play the primary role, in states that are functional, in maintaining order, 
collecting taxes, and funding services including education. But it has also outlived the circumstances 
that produced its long-time conceptual identity. The Treaty of Westphalia was signed to meet specific 
conditions in a war-torn and post-medieval but pre-industrial Europe, though in a context already 
starting to change. While  the future of the nation state in a global order is hard to predict, my critical 
interest is in its associated conceptions of justice as owed to fellow national citizens and democracy as 
largely about periodic elections of national governments and the need for their conceptual alteration, 
in the present discussion in relation to education. We begin with justice. 
3 Justice 
Global integration requires a revised conception of justice based on a principle of association beyond 
the physical, political and conceptual boundaries of nation states. These have long been taken to limit 
obligations to those outside the borders of the state. The practices, institutions, agreements, agencies 
and networks that now criss-cross the globe ground a new ethical framework for deliberation about 
who should get what and how this should be decided. In education, such questions ought now to be 
addressed in a wider frame than the nation state, if justice and democracy are accepted as key ethical 
principles in addressing the distribution of education.  
 
The principle of association is fundamental to our assumptions about who is owed duties of justice. 
Increasing evidence of emerging international institutions and agencies suggests that even if it is not 
in place yet, we are on the way to realising a global basic structure of some form – even if it is not 
likely to be simply a much larger nation state.  While a non-relational principle of global justice could 
be based on recognition of the common humanity of all, regardless of whether any human 
engagement is involved, many cosmopolitan theories of justice resist this alternative. For Moellendorf 
‘...justice is a property of social and political institutions so duties of egalitarian distributive justice 
don’t exist between persons merely in virtue of their personhood’ (Moellendorf 2009: 32). Duties of 
social justice, including duties to construct and support egalitarian institutions, do not fall immediately 
out of  rights to inherent dignity, but depend on the kind of association that generates them 
(Moellendorf 2009: 75).  
 
 A revised principle of association that acknowledges the fact of globalisation rests on a much 
expanded set of relations based on interdependence and shared membership of institutions and 
schemes of co-operation (Cohen & Sabel 2006). Cohen and Sabel identify global politics as the 
‘terrain of moral-political argument’ (2006:148), insisting that even if historically there was an 
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intimate connection between justice and the state, it is now mistaken to assign such a fundamental role 
to the state. They recast the notion of inclusion as central to the wider frame of global justice: 
Conceptions of global justice offer accounts of human rights, standards of fair governance, 
and norms of fair distributions (including access to such basic goods as health and education). 
Competing conceptions can be understood, then, as advancing alternative accounts of what 
inclusion demands: of the kind of respect and concern that is owed by the variety of agencies, 
organizations, and institutions (including states) that operate on the terrain of global politics.  
(2006:149) 
 
The wide range of relations that comprise this terrain now operate in: trade, financial regimes, the 
environment, labour relations, human rights, collective security, peacekeeping, health, education, and 
the International Criminal Court. That such forms of co-operation and accompanying norms are 
already in play can be seen in global developments in education since the middle of the twentieth 
century. Even in education, though policy and provision are still largely under the control of nation 
states, this is no longer a matter of separate nation states developing and implementing their own 
norms in a way that is closed off from those affected by the behaviour of their citizens and 
institutions. Those non-citizens also affected by the forms of association that connect them are 
implicated too and so eligible for considerations of justice.    
 
The establishment of UNESCO after the Second World War as a specialised agency of the United 
Nations Organisation (UN) triggered this co-operative, organisational and normative shift in 
education. As the body tasked with the role, from 1948 onwards, of fostering global security and 
peace through education conceived as a human right, UNESCO pursued the global development of 
education in collaboration with other UN agencies like the UNDP and UNICEF.  With an institutional 
design based on a principle of multilateral collaboration, UNESCO set out to support co-operation 
with governments and later with non governmental agencies too. Although its earlier work was 
vulnerable to the criticism that international co-operation in education was uncoordinated and tended 
to be dominated by western agencies and governments while allowing limited roles for local 
governments and recipients of aid to actively manage their own development (Mundy 2006), this 
nonetheless constituted a shift towards a more globally organised and justice-oriented international 
educational regime.    
 
The campaign for ‘Education for All’ marked a further shift from the 1990s towards a more co-
ordinated and extensive form of global collaboration in education. Arguing that this campaign 
signalled a very different regime, Mundy observes: 
The idea of 'education for all' has become part of a broadly based consensus about 'what 
works' among bilateral and multilateral development agencies. It is also a rallying call for 
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heads of state and international financial institutions, a focus for transnational advocacy, and 
an arena of expanding development practice characterized by widespread experimentation 
with new modes of aid delivery, new kinds of donor-recipient relationships and relatively 
high volumes of aid spending. (2006: 24) 
The goal established at the World Education Forum held in 2000 in Dakar reflects a common 
commitment to universal basic education for all, emphasising that education is a human right in all 
societies. The universal norm of providing free, compulsory primary education for all children by 
2015 (UNESCO 2000) marked the adoption of a significant global principle in the provision of 
educational opportunities. ‘Education is a fundamental human right. It is the key to sustainable 
development and peace and stability within and among countries, and thus an indispensable means for 
effective participation in the societies and economies of the twenty-first century, which are affected 
by globalisation’ (UNESCO 2000, Article 6). In urging universal educational provision, the earlier 
Jomtien Declaration had similarly described the basic need for learning as a universal responsibility.  
 
On the campaign’s universal norm of justice in education rests its consequent call for redress of 
economic disparities between countries. The campaign for Education for All identified the unequal 
distribution of resources as key to the global disparities in education, calling on the global community 
to make increased resources for education in poorer countries a priority. Although the campaign 
focused attention on the provision of primary education, and even though the goals of the campaign 
look unlikely to be fully met in all countries, the significance of these developments for the purpose of 
the present argument is clear: that a global basic norm had been agreed, alongside the principle that 
the availability of resources for education is an issue of global justice. In this respect the principle is a 
more expansively conceived one, more widely cast than a basic principle of association might be 
expressed, as it suggests obligations of educational justice among all states.  
The shared norms and priorities of the EFA campaign have led in turn to the setting  of monitored, 
measurable targets, crucially that of universal primary education by 2015. Mechanisms to coordinate 
donor activity  suggest that ‘UPE is steadily being recognised by rich governments as a global public 
good in need of collective rather than unilateral action’ (Mundy 2006: 38). A further significant shift, 
confirming the growth of global collaboration is the involvement of new actors in educational 
development: beside national governments and organisations like UNESCO, these now include the 
private sector, advocacy networks, unions and international NGOs. A wider range of players now 
participates in policy development and monitoring, in a reshaped ‘global architecture of education’ 
(Jones 20007) whose global scope transcends the previous authority structures tied exclusively to 
nation states. This transnational configuration of organisations, agencies and communities 
‘culminated in the turn of the century summits that produced the Millennium Development Goals 
reflecting commitments by broad international communities, not just collaborating states’ (Jones 
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2007: 330). The ongoing problem of a lack of resources in poorer countries is emphasised in annual 
EFA Monitoring Reports (e.g. UNESCO 2008) prompting calls for increased international support for 
the campaign. This emphasis on justice in redistribution of resources from the richest to the poorest 
countries is further evidence that a global principle of educational justice is well established, even if 
far from achieved. Its limited success so far, far from proving that the principle of educational justice 
across states is incoherent, mirrors arguments against domestic inequalities in educational opportunity 
and achievement within nation states.  
 
To my claim that these developments imply a required conceptual correction, from a state-bound 
conception of justice to an emergent global conception, it might be objected that the example of EFA 
does demonstrate increased international co-operation but that ultimately the notion of justice is tied 
to the motivations of individuals, and that the boundaries of the nation state inevitably define the 
limits of solidarity and hence restrict citizens’ moral horizons that still tie the meaning of justice to a 
domestic frame. But there is evidence that these ties are loosening. Gould (2007) proposes a revised 
conception of solidarity as social empathy that goes beyond the historical meaning that presupposed a 
relationship within single group, to include the forms of transnational solidarity now evident. Shared 
commitments to justice in cross-border relations (p.156) show an affective recognition of the plight 
and needs of distant others and a willingness to support them, as in the response to the 2004 Tsunami.  
A specifically educational example of such solidarity is public donation in support of Oxfam’s various 
educational initiatives (http://www.oxfam.org.uk/education). The assumption that national identity 
delimits the bounds of obligations to one another is increasingly questionable on empirical grounds. 
Relatedly, national membership does not persuade citizens of a common nation state to voluntarily 
share the burdens of providing resources for services like education. As Weinstock (2009) argues 
when discussing possibilities for global justice and democracy, the coercive power of the state has to 
be used in all modern states to require citizens to pay their taxes. ‘We simply do not have enough 
evidence to support the ambitious claim that co-nationals are naturally disposed to share with one 
another in ways that people from different countries are not’ (2009: 94). Furthermore, domestic 
disagreements about moral values and so about distributive justice are rife in liberal democracies and 
are no more amenable to resolution than they are in the international context (Miklos 2009: 109). A 
more prudential acknowledgement that the domestic-foreign divide is disintegrating concedes that 
inequalities in resources and political instability in the poorest and most troubled countries are a threat 
to peace and prosperity of rich countries. So self-interest may drive willingness to act for global 
justice. The richest countries are aware that they are threatened by global poverty, which increases 
health, security and environmental risks to their citizens (Weinstock 2009:100). ‘There are, in other 
words, “global public goods” – that is, goods that the world’s richest countries cannot obtain unless 
the needs of the global poor are catered to as well (Weinstock 2009: 98). 
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Shifts in political motivation towards global justice also have implications for the possibility and 
importance of transnational democracy. Exclusion from decision making about matters that directly 
affect them is an injustice to individuals, groups and societies that enjoy fewer resources and less 
influence over their distribution; such injustice reproduces other injustices. An obvious means to 
address injustice is through more democratic ways of allocating resources, hearing the demands for 
justice of those who get less.  
4 Democracy 
Having addressed potential statist objections to the argument for global justice, we now need to 
consider a similar objection to the parallel proposal that democracy too ought to be freed of the state-
centred logic of Westphalia, while looking to possibilities for post-Westphalian democracy.  
Adopting the term ‘democratic justice’, Marchetti argues that: ‘...true political justice is 
fundamentally entrenched in a procedural and multilayered democracy, within which all individuals 
can advance their claims and complaints in order to defend their freedom of choice’ (2008:1-2). 
Democracy is either global, he insists, ‘or it is not democracy’ (p. 1). Since interpretations of both 
justice and democracy are likely to continue to operate in both largely domestic but increasingly 
global arenas, for now this may be an overstatement, but Marchetti has an important point to make 
about the urgency of conceptual alteration in loosening democracy from its historical development as 
a modern layer of the states system. In truth, the development of transnational theories of democracy 
is not as far advanced as is the literature on global justice, but there is no shortage of proposals for 
preferred models and their predicted development. What is clear is that our thinking about democracy 
remains in thrall to national elections: ‘Wherever we look, the electorally oriented, vote-centric model 
really does seem to dominate practical political discourse on democracy’ (Goodin 2010:176). 
Those ready to dismiss the very idea of global democracy as preposterous have often taken it as 
axiomatic that it must mean world government, or at least an assembly elected by all citizens of all 
countries. Neither is necessary to a theory of global democracy, though it is worth noting that Held’s 
(1995) theory of cosmopolitan democracy has proposed an elected assembly as an additional UN 
structure. Various possibilities for world government are still taken seriously by some and less easily 
dismissed by their critics. But taking a long view of global democratisation as a process in its early 
stages, we would do well to follow Goodin’s advice (2010) and to look for first rather than final steps 
in this process, bearing in mind that historically democratisation of the nation state took five or six 
centuries. To pay too much a-historical attention to the extension of the franchise, and so to 
democracy understood as popular elections to a national assembly, with citizens requiring 
accountability of their national government in their own domestic sphere of authority, is to risk 
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ignoring the historical processes that led to the curbing of arbitrary power and gradually rendered the 
holders of power accountable for their conduct. These are crucial steps towards domestic democracy, 
as they are transnationally. The powers that affect citizens cross borders, be they the influence 
wielded by stronger governments than their own or the unaccountable actions of multinational 
corporations acting beyond governmental or popular accountability. Nor are citizens dependent on 
national elections to express their will; global networks and organisations offer other means to do so.  
But what alternatives to state-centred structures or practices are possible? Several options have been 
put forward so far and they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Some theorists turn to the 
European Union (EU) as suggesting what a transnational democratic order might be like. Cohen and 
Sabel (2004: 158) see the EU as such a ‘nascent political order’, with democratic potential in its web 
of problem-solving procedures. Similarly, though acknowledging that there is room for further 
development, Bohman describes the EU as ‘an ongoing experiment in political integration’ (Bohman 
2007: 172) that has produced innovations in deliberation and a transnational institutional design with 
further potential for democratisation towards a transnational order.  Its progress in fostering human 
rights is held up as particularly praiseworthy. ‘With the recognition of the full range of human rights 
of all persons within a complex and differentiated institutional structure, the EU shifts from a regional 
to a cosmopolitan polity’ (Bohman 2007: 150). Habermas has given much attention to European 
integration within a model of global governance (2009). Globalisation, especially global markets, 
necessitates a form of political regulation above the national level. Habermas calls not for a world 
government that supersedes nation states but for a form of supranational transnational regime to 
complement nation states that could regulate matters of collective concern like global economic 
crises. Asking how public communication could operate above the national level, in a Europe-wide 
public sphere, he envisages a deliberative model of transnational democracy and an associated 
Europe-wide public sphere. In spite of the crisis of the Euro, it can still plausibly be argued that the 
current crisis of financial regulation will accelerate the growth of institutions that will ultimately 
deepen European political integration. The EU remains an institutional example that stretches 
traditional conceptions about the meaning of democracy. This view has its critics and it is important to 
note, for example, Scheuerman’s position that ‘...the realization of a global federal republic, or even a 
federal Europe, seems politically unrealistic today’ (2009: 59), and his caution that democratisation 
beyond the nation state poses many difficulties and is a long term project.  Arguing from a rather 
different critical angle, Goodin cautions that ‘When it comes to the global polity, we are still very 
much in the early days – both of developing a global polity, and still more of democratizing it’ (2010: 
179). 
 
Goodin’s more cautious assessment points to various international ‘accountability mechanisms’ as 
evidence of the growth of ‘networked governance’, which he describes as comparable with those 
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present in the early phases of domestic democracy. He cites as examples professional associations and 
policy networks, which comprise communities now able to assert norms transnationally in monitoring 
the conduct of governments, NGOs, INGOs and private bodies. Instead of supporting the more 
visionary predictions about future transnational political structures, Goodin prefers to advance the 
idea of a ‘slippery slope’ towards global democratic inclusion, attributing to the ‘stickiness’  of 
democracy potential for further widening mechanisms of accountability. 
 
Other possibilities on offer in the debate about possible and preferred future directions for global 
democracy focus on the potential of deliberative democracy.  Bohman’s recent work (2009) turns to 
the potential formation of publics, drawing on public sphere theory, which is an influential presence in 
current theories of global democracy. Bohman’s sustained explorations look to a conception of 
‘distributed deliberation’, rather than civil society, as offering the best potential for democratisation as 
the kind of ‘communicative freedom across borders’ (p. 149) that could successfully challenge 
political domination. Enabling NGOs to monitor institutions’ performance and to rally cross-border 
public opinion, the public sphere thus understood is exemplified in the work of, say, Amnesty 
International and anti-whaling groups. Technologically mediated public communication can advance 
what Bohman calls multiple demoi that enable citizens to deliberate. Pointing to the obvious example 
of the internet, Bohman also cites emergent practices in the EU, such as the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC), that enable citizens to simultaneously debate EU policies with citizens 
elsewhere in Europe. 
 
It seems likely that global democracy will develop across multiple sites and practices, but that 
controversy about the extent to which the conceptual dominance of the nation state has been loosened 
and what might replace it does not reduce the salience of the case against the monopoly of the 
Westphalian conception of political authority, justice and democracy. Although none of the emergent 
possibilities has clinched the argument, there is no shortage of possibilities. As a central democratised 
authority is unlikely to emerge, it is likely that democratisation of global governance will be 
piecemeal and partial, with a continuing role for the nation state even as its dominance recedes. 
Wherever efforts to promote transnational democracy are ultimately concentrated, it is evident that the 
ways we conceive of democracy in the ethics of education need to shift beyond the conceptual 
straightjacket of the nation state. 
5 Education 
Taking globalisation seriously, I have argued, requires conceptual correction, altering our 
understanding of both justice and democracy to accommodate the expanding global frame in which 
ethical assumptions and decisions now operate. Although, as the EFA campaign demonstrates, 
conceptual alteration is now evident in the transnational norms, structures and initiatives in pursuit of 
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universal primary education, actual progress towards global justice in education to date is modest. 
Global access to education falls a very long way short of equal opportunities in early years, 
secondary, further, and higher education – and improved access to primary education still varies 
widely in quality and outcomes.  
The fact of vast global inequalities in educational opportunities, dictated by the accident of where 
people are born, is both a consequence and on ongoing cause of economic inequalities between nation 
states. These in turn are at least partly a result of a global history that includes northern enrichment at 
the expense of southern poverty. Some countries thus have the advantage in developing their citizens 
as human resources that support competitive national economies in global markets. Their populations 
will also enjoy growing advantages in acquiring the skills needed to access and use the global 
mechanisms and publics that comprise emergent transnational democratic structures and practices. If 
economic prosperity and higher levels of education are more conducive to democracy, educational 
inequalities between nation states are of huge significance to global justice and to the relative 
capacities of citizens in different nation states to assert demands for resources and redress through 
democratic structures, whether by using domestic institutions or in access to global mechanisms and 
publics. So great are the disparities at stake that even anti globalisation activity, ironically of a kind 
organised on global scale (see Meyer 2007: 270)  and using the technologies at the heart of 
globalisation, is the preserve of those schooled  in the discourse of human rights, ICT skills and 
democracy. Beyond these elites, the ‘utterly peripheral people who are outside the sweep of 
globalisation, in the current world, are almost invisible’ (p. 270). A state-centred logic in the ethics of 
education is inadequate to thinking seriously about such injustice.    
References 
Bohman, J. (2007) Democracy Across Borders: From Demos to Demoi, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press.  
Bohman, J. (2009) Democratization through transnational publics: deliberation across borders, in R. 
Geenens and R. Tinnevelt (eds) Does Truth Matter? Democracy and Public Space, Secaucus NJ: 
Springer 149-165. 
Caporaso, J. (2000) Changes in the Westphalian order: territory, public authority and sovereignty, 
International Studies Review 2(2) 1-28. 
Cohen, J. and Sabel, C. (2004) Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU and US, in K-H. Ladeur (ed) Public 
Governance in the Age of Globalization, Farnham: Ashgate 157-175. 
Cohen, J. and Sabel, C. (2006) Extra republicum nulla justitia? Philosophy & Public Affairs 34(2) 
147-175. 
12 
 
Enslin, P. and Tjiattas, M. (2012) Democratic inclusion and lifelong learning in a globalising world, 
in D. Aspin et al (eds) International Handbook of Lifelong Learning,  2nd edition, Dordrecht: 
Springer  77-90. 
Enslin, P. and Tjiattas, M. (2015) Education, justice and the limits of statism, in R Marples,  J Suissa 
&  C Winstanley (eds) Education, Philosophy and Wellbeing; New Perspectives on the Work of John 
White, London: Routledge, 142-159.  
Goodin, R. (2010) Global democracy: in the beginning, International Theory 2(2) 175-209. 
Gould, C. (2007) Transnational solidarities, Journal of Social Philosophy 38(1) 148-164   
Habermas, J. (2009) Europe: The Faltering Project, Cambridge: Polity.  
Held, D. (1995)  Democracy and the Global Order, Cambridge: Polity. 
Jones, P. (2007) Education and world order, Comparative Education 43(3) 325-337. 
Marchetti, R. (2008) Global Democracy: For and Against, London: Routledge. 
Meyer, J. (2007) Globalization: theory and trends, International Journal of Comparative Sociology 48 
(4-5) 261-273. 
Miklos, A. (2009) Nationalist criticisms of cosmopolitan justice, Public Reason 1:1 105-125. 
Moellendorf, D. (2009) Global Inequality Matters, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Mundy, K. (2006) Education for All and the new development compact, International Review of 
Education 52(1/2) 23-48. 
Scheuerman, W. (2006) Globalization, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford, CA: The 
Centre for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University, Online at     
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/globalization/  (accessed 30-12-2012).  
Scheuerman, W. (2009) Postnational democracies without postnational states? Some skeptical 
reflections, Ethics & Global Politics 2(1) 41-63.                 
Weinstock, D. (2009) Motivating the global demos, Metaphilosophy 40(1) 92-108. 
UNESCO 2000. Dakar Framework for Action: Education For All: Meeting Our Collective 
Commitments' including six regional frameworks for action, Online at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001211/121147e.pdf (accessed 28-02-2008). 
13 
 
UNESCO (2008).  EFA Global Monitoring Report: Education for All by 2015, will we make it? 
Online at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001548/154820e.pdf (accessed 1-7-2012).  
